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A EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT POLICY WITHOUT POLITICS:  HOW EUROPEAN BUREAUCRATS 
USED EXPERTISE AS POWER EXPANSION 
 
ABSTRACT This paper investigates how a policy-model articulates two streams that 
have long been considered by both academics and political stakeholders as mutually 
exclusive. The European employment flexicurity model explicitly combines flexibility 
(on the labour markets) and security (for the workers). It clarifies European objectives 
in the social and employment policy field centred on a mutually reinforcing vision of 
the employers’ and employees’ rights and duties. At both European and domestic 
levels, various political actors (trade unions, employers’ representative, political 
leaders) have endorsed the need for policy-reforms centred on the structuring 
elements of the European flexicurity model (flexibilisation of employment contracts; 
active labour market policies; life-long learning schemes; modernization of social 
security schemes1). This paper shows that the construction of this policy-model was 
not the result of a political process. Politics (domestic uploading strategies, political 
leaders and political parties, etc.) cannot explain the emergence of the European 
flexicurity model. Rather, the alliance between academic experts and a few actors in 
the directorate general of employment affairs of the Commission took the lead over 
political mobilization. The use of national policy comparisons in European reports 
and policy documents allowed the directorate of employment and social affairs to 
expand its legitimacy within the Commission and among national actors.  
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1 Communication of the European Commission, COM 2007 (359), Towards Common 
Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European employment flexicurity model was defined in 2006-2007 and combines 
‘flexibility’ (on the labour markets) and ‘security’ (for the workers)2. Academics and 
policy-makers have traditionally considered these two streams as mutually exclusive. 
However, and in the absence of executive competences in the employment field, the 
European Commission built a policy-model that both challenges national welfare 
regimes (particularly the conservative-corporatist – or continental – one) and have 
been endorsed by various political stakeholders in Europe. 
Four elements structure the model3. The balance of these elements can be considered 
ambiguous but nevertheless restrict national policy-making. First, this paper shows 
that the European construction of the flexicurity model is largely a non-political 
process. It was not thoroughly discussed in political arenas (European and national 
institutions or political parties). Nor, was it an agenda set by social partners or the 
result of European social dialogue. Political leaders did not consistently engaged in its 
promotion at the European level. National bureaucrats in the Council or Permanent 
Representations did not try to make their domestic models endorsed by European 
institutions (uploading). Rather, research and publications of national academics 
(especially from the Netherlands and Denmark) were significantly used in the mid-
2000s reports of the Commission. The paper contributes to the literature on uploading 
strategies in a European context. Whereas the literature on uploading strategies as so 
far focused on diplomats (Tonra, 2000; Jabkobsen, 2009) and political leaders 
(Blunden, 2000; Lefebvre, 2004, Haverland, 2009), this paper sheds light on the role 
of national academics in the construction of a policy-model that mirrors the domestic 
employment schemes they have analysed in their research. The Dutch, and then the 
Danish model, have been thoroughly discussed by national academics from these 
countries since the mid-1990s). Using the web of European Foundations, satellite 
                                                
2 In European official documents, the term itself first appears in the Employment in Europe 
2006 report. It breakthroughs in a 2007 Communication of the European Commission, COM 
2007 (359), Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and better jobs through 
flexibility and security. 
3The four components of the European flexicurity model as defined in the 2007 
Communication of the Commission are: 1) Flexibilisation of employment contracts; Active 
labour market policies; Life-long learning schemes; Modernization of social security 
schemes. 
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European institutions (e.g., the European Economic and Social Committee) and 
European think tanks, but more importantly because European bureaucrats have 
mobilized them, these academics have entered – and influenced – the European 
debate. Successful policy models such as the ‘Dutch Miracle’ or the ‘Danish Golden 
Triangle’ (Madsen, 2002) were crafted by European academics and used by actors in 
the directorate general for employment and social affairs (DG EMPL) of the 
Commission to influence the blooming of a European consensus on the issue.  
All in all, the process was not without political conflicts, but these conflicts were 
more important after the stabilization of the European model in 2007 than during the 
process as such. The late politicization of flexicurity in a second phase (after the 
Communication of the Communication and the consecutive resolution of the Council 
voted by the European Parliament) has increased since the beginning of the financial 
and economic crisis in 2008. This sequence is not the focus of this paper but it 
worth’s noting that the framed discourse on the Danish model was a way for the 
Commission to ‘sell flexicurity’ to social partners and left-wing political leaders and 
parties. Indeed, the fact that the model was largely framed on the Danish model made 
it difficult ETUC for trade union representatives in Brussels (ETUC) to hand out (and 
eventually step back). The Danish model was hardly questionable because it was 
largely presented as an alternative to the liberal model promoted by the OECD in the 
1990s. More importantly, the Danish model (which is a mix of labour market 
flexibility and high social security, hold together by active labour market policies4) is 
known to rely on a balanced social dialogue and to provide high standards of security 
for its citizens.  
While Radaelli argues that “the power of expertise is being counterbalanced by 
politicization” (1999:757), this paper shows that flexicurity has not been highly 
politicized in European institutions (section 1). The relative absence of member states 
and national bureaucrats in the process of the construction of the European flexicurity 
model was counterbalanced by the role of academic experts (who often come from 
‘pioneers flexicurity countries’ such as the Netherlands and Denmark), which 
contributed to the depoliticization of the debate (section 2). This paper investigates 
the role of national academics and national bureaucrats and identifies the mechanisms 
under the construction of such a coalition. According to Radaelli, the main debate on 
                                                
4 These are the three elements of the ‘Danish Golden Triangle’. 
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the role of expertise in policy-making “is not about types of actor (experts instead of 
elected politicians) but about the change in the nature of power” (1999: 759). Without 
undermining the importance of the ‘nature of power’, this paper shows that the types 
of actors not only matters but also that their influence does not only depend on the 
organizational structures in which they publicize their ideas. In the case of flexicurity, 
structured organizations and instances of academic expertise were not crucial. While 
several studies have been interested in epistemic communities (Haas, 1992; Zito, 
1998, 2001), experts groups (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2008), high-level groups 
(Horn, 2008), networks of expertise (Radaelli, 1998), think-tanks (Stone, Denham and 
Garnett, 1998) or Committees (Pedler and Schaefer, 1996; Joerges and Vos, 1999), 
this paper shows that such structured instances were not necessary for academic 
experts to influence European policy objectives. From a political science perspective, 
this argument can be surprising. However, despite of the lack of structured instances 
that organize experts’ interaction, their influence was possible because flexicurity was 
discussed in the context of soft law and the Open-Method of Coordination (OMC)5. 
As the OMC has allowed for the development of periodic monitoring of national 
social reforms, the pace of European reporting increased. The paper shows that these 
reports were particularly important to craft ‘successful policy models’. Academic 
expertise was presented in these reports, which were more crucial in the definition of 
flexicurity than structured instances of academic expertise.    
This research relies on semi-directed interviews with European actors. It qualitatively 
analyzes the arguments and sources presented in official and political documents; 
when necessary, quantitative data is provided to describes issue salience and discusses 
politicization. The first section of the paper shows that the emergence of the European 
flexicurity model does not originate from national governments and bureaucrats and 
that the process was not politicized in European institutions (European Council, 
Council of the Ministers, European Parliament). National leaders and bureaucrats or 
social partners did not engage for its implementation. The second section of the paper 
                                                
5 The European Council of Lisbon in March 2000 introduced the “Open Method of 
Coordination”. It is based on soft-law (by contrast to ‘hard-law’, soft-law is not legally 
constraining for the member states) and involves the fixation of guidelines and timetables for 
achieving short, medium and long-term goals; the translation of these guidelines into national 
and regional policies; the establishment of quantitative and qualitative indicators and 
benchmarks, as a means of comparing best practices; and the periodic monitoring of the 
progress achieved.  
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shows that academic expertise was mobilized in European reports driven by DG 
EMPL. European bureaucrats in DG EMPL engaged in a “let’s bandwagon strategy”, 
that is that they mobilised the increasing used of national comparisons and academic 
knowledge to draw successful policy models and ask European laggards to 
bandwagon.  
The paper sheds light on a European policy-making process and investigates the 
interface between nation states and the EU. It contributes to the literature on 
uploading strategies by stressing the way academic experts from specific countries 
contributed to the definition of European policy objectives. National academics 
worked on the definition (and one might say uploading) of their national models and 
actors within DG EMPL institutionally supported it. The former hence gave visibility 
to their research and sometimes increased their academic resources at home, while the 
latter increased their legitimacy within the Commission.  
 
SECTION 1. WHY IT IS NOT ABOUT STATES OR POLITICS 
1.1. ‘Big’ and ‘small’ states, national leaders, and intergovernmentalism 
When it comes to discuss the role of member states in the definition of European 
policies, liberal intergovernmentalist theory is the one that first comes to mind. The 
renewal of this approach in the early 1990s and the focus on the central role of 
national governments in the European policy-making make clear the original 
argument according which European integration strengthens states sovereignty and 
optimize national gains (instead of undermining national policy-making capacity) 
(Milward, 1992). My concern here is not to address the consequences of the 
development of European policies but to evaluate the role of member states in the 
definition of European policies. For liberal intergovernmentalist theorists, it is clear 
that the objectives of European policies cannot be at odd with member states 
preferences. An important element concerns the bargaining power of the member 
states, the most powerful being the larger economic ones (Moravscik, 1998). If we 
follow this assumption, the definition of flexicurity would allow national governments 
of large (and economically powerful) European countries to legitimate a new policy 
agenda oriented towards flexibilisation (of employment contracts), activation (of 
labour market policies), life-long learning schemes and modernization of social 
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protection. Among the different types of welfare regimes defined by Esping-Andersen 
in its influential Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), the conservative-
corporatist regimes (that is, continental countries6) are the most distant from European 
schemes7. To put it differently, the European employment policy model mixes liberal 
(e.g., flexible contracts) and Scandinavian elements (e.g. active labour market 
policies). In any cases, the traditional features of continental welfare regimes, that is 
the commitment to employment status, open-ended and permanent employment 
contracts (Esping-Andersen, 1990) are far from European schemes. From this 
principle derives a set of conservative-corporatist elements, among which the 
subordination of unemployment benefits to previous work, which favours passive 
labour market policies8. What is striking is that these continental countries (France, 
Italy, Germany…) all belong to the ‘large states’ category (in terms of their territory 
as well as their economic power within Europe). According to liberal 
intergovernmentalist theorists they are the one that are powerful in the European 
bargaining process. Hence, they should be the ones that pushed in the direction of the 
definition of European flexicurity schemes.  
Some authors interested in the role of member states in the definition of European 
policies have shown that, contrarily to liberal intergovernmentalist hypotheses, ‘small 
states’ (usually defined in terms of their population and territory) are not always kept 
out of European decisions. This literature highlights the conditions under which small 
states can influence European decisions: the building of alliances and the 
maximisation of joint action (Rothstein, 1968), their reputation and expertise in a 
                                                
6 In this paper, I use the term ‘conservative-corporatist’ when I refer to the welfare regime and 
‘continental’ to refer to the countries/leaders in a more general sense.  
7 According to André Sapir, “there is a strong case for reforming European labour market and 
social policies, especially in continental and Mediterranean countries (…). By relying on 
strict employment protection laws at a time of rapid change when old jobs and practices are 
no longer warranted, it discourages adaptation to change and preserves the status quo. The 
system therefore reduces overall employment and raises unemployment” (2006: 381). 
8 In these countries, workers contribute to the unemployment benefits funds when they are 
employed. Thus, in case of unemployment they have earned the right to benefit from 
unemployment insurance because they previously contributed to the system (when they were 
working). From this follows that, traditionally, they are not asked for counterparts 
(participation in training schemes, accepting jobs that do not completely fit with their skills, 
etc.). 
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given field (Kronsell, 2002), or the ability to use their Presidency of the European 
Council to influence European objectives (Björkdahl, 2008)9.  
As such, the recognition of the role of small states in the EU decision-making is not a 
crucial challenge to liberal intergovernmentalist theory. If it were not the case, liberal 
intergovernmentalists would still be comfortable if they can show that the definition 
of such policy objectives does not undermine continental governments at the national 
level or if they prove that European objectives serve continental leaders. Indeed, as 
long as the definition of a policy model incompatible with traditional conservative-
corporatist schemes actually legitimizes a new policy agenda in these countries it can 
thus strengthens national continental executives. In other words, “pooled sovereignty” 
does not mean that the role of states in the European systems diminished (Milward, 
1992). As I have shown, European schemes contradict conservative-corporatist 
schemes. It could be argued that European demands on flexicurity actually serve 
continental leaders when they want to reform conservative-conservative policies; this 
is probably the case. However, even if it were the case and that the definition of 
flexicurity happens to serve the interests of national executives in conservative-
corporatist welfare regimes, the point I want to make is that the example of European 
flexicurity does not confirm the crucial role of member states (understood as national 
executives and political leaders) in this case of EU policy-making. This paper instead 
argues that the emergence of the flexicurity model at the European agenda occurred 
with no crucial political debate. While Scandinavian member states’ reputation in the 
employment policy field is supported by conclusive proofs (notably, in Employment 
in Europe reports since the 1990s), they did not engage in uploading strategies, nor 
did they take up the opportunity given by their Presidencies of European Councils to 
promote such European goals. National executives and political leaders (from both 
‘large’ and ‘small’ states, conservative-corporatist or social-democrat – i.e., 
Scandinavian – welfare regimes) were conspicuous by their absence in their 
traditional European fora (European Council, Council of the Ministers); so were 
national bureaucrats (Committees of the Council, Permanent Representations).  
1.2. The surprising absence of political commitment by national representatives 
The European Council is probably the most evident instance in which political leaders 
                                                
9 Such studies and particularly the ones that have been interested in the role of Nordic states 
have particularly focused on the European foreign and external relations policies. 
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can find the opportunity to engage in bargaining process when they want to contribute 
to the definition of European policy objectives (Moravscik, 2002). It is also the most 
natural forum in which they can try to upload their model. The case of environmental 
policies has been an example to show that member states (political leaders, ministers, 
national bureaucrats) engage (in European Councils as well as in the Council of 
Ministers) in uploading strategies of their domestic policy models in the aim of 
developing European policies according to domestic preferences. Thus, they can 
decrease implementation costs when they have to transpose European directives 
(Liefferink and Andersen, 1997, 1998; Börzel, 2002). 
Figure 1 highlights that the proportion of discussions devoted to employment issues 
between the head of states and governments during European Councils have 
decreased from 1993 to 2010.  
 
Figure 1. Part of the Council Conclusions devoted to employment issues 
 
 
With the exception of the high salience of employment issues discussed at the 
Luxembourg Council (extraordinary Council on employment) in 1997, which defined 
the European Employment Strategy (or the 2000 European Council in Lisbon which 
defined the Lisbon Strategy), the discussion over employment issues are not only 
marginal but also decreased. Otherwise, we see that, as far as they preside the 
European Council, Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark) or the Netherlands 
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(that all were the subject of European attention in the process of designing European 
flexicurity and were presented as models by the Commission) were not particularly 
involved in the discussion on employment issues. Such observation is largely 
confirmed by interviews in Nordic and others Permanent Representations of the 
member states to the European Union. Several reasons explain that Scandinavian 
countries were not promoters of the development of flexicurity at the European level. 
First and foremost, their governments do not call for the development of European 
integration in the social and employment field, but rather wish to keep this field 
autonomous from European institutions. Second, national representatives from Nordic 
countries consider that their employment policy schemes are part of a complex and 
balance context that includes social dialogue, high representation of workers within 
trade unions and a strong integration within the international economy; a context that 
can not easily be transferred or imitated in different national settings10.   
This does not mean that the European Councils were completely silent on the issue. 
During the first semester of 2006, the Austrian Presidency placed flexicurity on the 
agenda of an informal meeting of European Ministers of Employment, Social Policy, 
Health and Consumer Affairs. A few weeks later, the Commission provided a first 
attempt to define flexicurity in its “2006 Employment in Europe Report” in which 
country-scores are presented and the four elements presented in the further 2007 
Communication already presented. In January 2007, the German Presidency 
organized an Informal Meeting of the European Labour Ministers. The ‘quality of 
work’ a term that is not central in the definition of the Commission presented in its 
2007 Communication. Moreover, German representatives expressed the need to take a 
“less is more approach” and did not favour more regulation at the European level. In 
all cases, European Council Presidencies were either not crucial or not considerably 
favourable to the development of European regulation in that field. 
Also, national representatives from these countries were not completely absent from 
the process of construction of the European model of flexicurity. The Swedish 
Minister of Labour presented his views on flexicurity at the Employment and Social 
Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on 11 April 2007. Also, Wim Kok, 
former Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1994-2002), can be considered as the only 
politician who clearly and significantly supported the model, both in the Netherlands 
                                                
10 Interviews, 31 May 2010 (c), 1 June 2010 (a), 3 June 2010 (a), 4 June 2010 (a). 
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and in Brussels (as well as punctually in others European capitals). Kok’s European 
reports for the Commission were both very important in the history of the 
construction of the flexicurity model11. However, I argue that DG EMPL of the 
Commission needed and asked for such a commitment that directly participated in 
DG EMPL’s interest in a time where political support was precisely lacking. This 
does not undermine their political interest for the issue but shows that their support 
was more the result of a call from the Commission than of their autonomous will to 
explicitly upload policy models they have implemented at home.  
In the second half of 2006, the Finish Presidency asked the Employment Committee 
of the Council of Ministers (EMCO) to work on a further definition of the flexicurity 
concept on the basis of the 2006 Cambridge review12 and the National Reforms 
Programs13. The emphasis is put on people at the margins of the labour markets, 
flexicurity and life-long learning for older workers14. Within the Council of Ministers, 
a resolution was adopted on 9 October 2007. Flexicurity was presented as a European 
need in a context of ageing population and international competitiveness. Not 
surprisingly, the resolution also insisted on the variety of policy strategies that can be 
derived from the model, the refusal of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy being an important 
element for the member states. It also called for maintaining efforts toward sound and 
financially sustainable budgetary policies and the cost-effectiveness of the measures 
taken at the national level.  
Actually, the main point of disagreement that was raised by the member states 
concerned the definition of policy pathways that the Commission wished to present. 
Member states rejected this approach, which was seen as a guide for policy reforms 
because they did not want to be caught in a “one-size or four-size fits all policy”15. 
More precisely, they locked a future possibility for the Commission to evaluate their 
reforms and reject the idea of reforming according to policy-sequences. As a result 
                                                
11 Jobs, Jobs, Jobs. Creating More Employment in Europe (2003), and Facing the Challenge: 
The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment (2004). 
12 Cambridge Reviews are conduced on a yearly basis by the Employment Committee of the 
Council. They evaluate national progress in the field of employment reforms.  
13 Since the relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, member states hand out National 
Reforms Programs (NRP) to the Commission every year. In these NRP they présent the 
measures they have taken to answer European goals. They serve as a basis of an evaluation by 
the Commission and the Council.  
14 Report of the EMCO Ad Hoc Group on the outcome the Cambridge Review country 
examination of the employment sections of the NRPs for 2006, EMCO/21/131106/EN- final. 
15 Interview, 1 June 2010. 
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the ‘pathways’ were not directly included in the Communication but only presented in 
the annex, which makes them not compulsory. 
All in all, as far as European Councils and Council of Ministers are concerned that 
represent national interests in Brussels are concerned, they have not been instances of 
high promotion of flexicurity. In the process of construction of the flexicurity model, 
political action was far from being crucial. In that sense, the paper confirms that 
member states had never been keen on ceding even competence to the Union over 
social policy.  
1.3. Absence of politicisation in the phase of construction of the model 
Another way to evaluate the role of the member states in the construction of European 
flexicurity is to look at the votes at the European Parliament on the resolution. Of 
course, such data are not concerned with national representatives as such. Members of 
the European Parliament are not supposed to represent the national interest but are 
organized according to political groups. However, such data give clue on the national 
cohesion behind flexicurity. Figure 2 shows that, contrary to France and Germany 
(two major continental countries and conservative-corporatist welfare regimes), 
eastern and Mediterranean countries were more cohesive on the flexicurity issue that 
they were on employment and social affairs in general.  
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Figure 2. Votes European Parliament – Cohesion per member states 
 
Source: www.votewatch.eu 
 
 
The European Parliament engaged in the formal process of discussion about the text 
after the publication of the Commission on June 27th, 2007. However, the issue did 
not raise important political debates within the European Parliament’s Committees. 
Although the rapporteur on the issue, Ole Christensen is from Denmark16, the Danish 
                                                
16 Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. 
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experience was not directly referred in his report17. More precisely, as far as national 
models are concerned, they were only quoted once (“the Nordic and the Netherlands”) 
in an argument that referred to the comprehensive system surrounding flexicurity in 
these countries18. It mentioned “the widespread fears that the term has been hijacked 
to provide cover for what is essentially a deregulatory drive, giving priority to the 
needs of employers over those of employees”19. The main issue stressed in the report 
was the statement according which open-ended contracts should form the basis of a 
social security system, a point that directly challenged the Commission’s interest in 
the implementation of more flexible contracts (stated as the first pillar of flexicurity in 
COM 2007(359). 
The final resolution of the European Parliament was very close from Christensen’s 
report and focused on the need to support the ‘European Social Model’ and the 
balance between the elements of the flexibility-security axis20. It was rather positive 
on the ‘flexicurity pathways’ brought by the Commission and rejected by the 
Council21. Also, the report largely focused on labour law issues. This is not surprising 
because the European Parliament does not have an explicit and decisive role in the 
policy processes that derived from the soft law approach, amongst which flexicurity 
and most employment policy issues are concerned with. Its role is much more 
important in the co-decision process when hard law (that is, directives) is concerned22. 
The strong interest in labour law was not irrelevant since the Commission issued a 
Green Paper on labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century, on November 
22, 2006, a theme directly related to flexicurity.  
The debates within the different Committees of the European Parliament are relevant 
sources to trace the politicisation of flexicurity (that is: the way public debates are 
                                                
17 Ole Christensen, Draft Report on “Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity: More and 
better jobs through flexibility and security”, (2007/0000(INI)), Committee on Employment 
and Social Affairs, 29 August 2007.  
18 Idem. 
19 Idem. 
20 European Parliament reference number: A6-0446/2007 / P6-TA-PROV(2007)0574. 
21 As a consequence of member states refusal to draw pathways, which were seen as too 
constraining, the ‘flexicurity pathways’ do not appear in COM 2007 (359) but are annexed to 
the document. This has been the most conflictual debate between the Commission and the 
member states. 
22 Also, such a stand is not irrelevant since the Commission issued a Green Paper on labour 
law to meet the challenges of the 21st century, on November 22, 2006. 
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given a political character). Academic work shows that the European Parliament is 
able to play a strong role in the politicisation of social issues, the ‘Bolkenstein 
directive’ (or ‘service directive’) being the best recent example (Crespy, 2010). In the 
relevant Committees of the European Parliament, the debates were not harsh but 
rather focused on the natural issues concerned in each Committee. For instance, while 
the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs regreted that rigid national 
employment protection levels and reminded that internships are valuable for young 
people to gain experience, the Committee on Culture and Education highlighted the 
need to implement the transferability of acquired social security rights and the 
Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender equality stressed the need to support the 
smoothest possible transition from one job to another, including parental leaves, but 
also the gender-sensitive definition of the common principles of flexicurity. 
Table 3 sums up the votes within the different Committees of the European 
Parliament and shows that the Committees interested in the issue did not reject the 
flexicurity model. Indeed, only one vote occurred against the text at the Committee on 
Culture and Education. However, the final vote over the EP’s resolution was less 
consensual since 93 MEPs finally voted against the text. 
Table 3. Votes in the European Parliament’s Committee 
 For  Against Abst. 
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs 36 6 1 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 39 0 0 
Committee on Culture and Education 20 1 0 
Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 16 0 0 
Final vote 29 November 2007 492 93 51 
Source: Legislative Observatory, European Parliament23 
Another perspective is given by an analysis of the votes within political groups. Table 
4 makes it clear that the politicization of flexicurity in the European Parliaments does 
not necessarily follow classical left-right divides. The four most important groups – 
EPP-ED, ESP, ADLE and UEN – voted predominantly in favour of the resolution. 
The only consistent and unified opposition came from the GUE, while the Greens, NI 
and IND/DEM were somewhat hostile to the resolution but highly divided.  
                                                
23 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5531922 
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Another valuable information that one can draw from Table 4 is that right-wing 
political groups tended to be highly cohesive during this vote, while left-wing groups 
were more divided. All right-wing groups were more cohesive during this vote than 
during all votes on Employment and Social Affairs (+4.83 percentage points for the 
EPP/DE, +10.34 points for ADLE and +25 percentage points for the UEN). On the 
contrary, left-wing groups tended to be more divided during this vote than other votes 
on Employment and Social Affairs (-19,84 points for the ESP, -37,14 points for the 
Greens and -25,03 points for the GUE). 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this information is that flexicurity schemes, as 
decided by the European Parliament, do correspond rather well to all national centre-
right parties and their MEPs, while left-wing parties had a hard time opposing these 
measures, hence making the vote not political as such. Despite of such results, it may 
be too early to speak of “post-adversarial politics” at the EU level (Radaelli, 1999: 
758). Indeed, after the Communication of the Commission, the case of flexicurity has 
indeed been politicized at the national level. However, the focus of this paper is on the 
emergence of the European model of flexicurity and the process of its European 
definition. It shows that flexicurity was not very politicized during this first phase 
(emergence and construction of the model as opposed to its reception and the way it 
was discussed at the national level once it was defined at the European level). 
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Table 4. Votes by political groups 
 For Against Abst. Total 
members 
Cohesion 
Flexicurity24 
Cohesion 
Employment 
and Social 
Affairs 
(2004-2009) 
 PPE-DE 
215 6 8 281 90,83% 86% 
 PSE 
149 14 20 218 72,13% 92% 
ALDE/ADLE 
80 2 0 104 96,34% 86% 
 UEN 
35 0 0 45 100% 75% 
 Greens/EFA 
1 24 10 42 52,86% 90% 
 GUE-NGL 
0 23 6 41 68,97% 94% 
 NI 
9 10 6 35 10,00% NA 
 IND/DEM 
3 14 1 23 66,67% 47% 
Total 492 93 51 789   
 
All in all, the first section of this paper shows that European institutions were, by no 
means, agents of national governments. National leaders or national bureaucrats did 
not push European flexicurity forward. European Councils and Council of the 
Ministers were, by no means, agents of national governments. At the European 
Parliament,  the four most important groups (EPP-ED, ESP, ADLE and UEN) voted 
predominantly in favour of the resolution. Furthermore, the politicization of 
flexicurity in the European Parliaments did not follow classical left-right divides. 
Right-wing political groups tended to be highly cohesive during this vote (more than 
they were on employment and social affairs during the 2004-2009 legislature). Left-
wing groups were more divided and not cohesive in their opposition.  
To complement this section on the weak influence of politics, the role of social 
                                                
24 ‘Cohesion’ shows to what extent a European Party Group voted as a block. 
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partners has to be discussed. The paper argues that their role was not crucial in the 
phase of definition of flexicurity, that is, they were not at the centre of the process. 
This does not mean that the issue disinterested them. For the first time, they presented 
a joint analysis of labour market problems at the Tripartite Social Summit in Lisbon 
on 18 October 2007 and agreed on a set of flexicurity guidelines, but they were not at 
the origins of the process25. Rather, the paper argues that their joint analysis was used 
by the Commission to outwit political hostility of trade unions representatives in 
Brussels. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), which has since 
increasingly been concerned with the threat that the flexicurity model represents for 
workers’ rights, now argues that flexicurity was designed to make it easier for 
employers to hire and fire workers.  
If social partners welcomed the debate on the shift from rights linked to employment 
to rights linked with the individual, their role in the construction and acceptance of a 
European model of flexicurity is rather ambiguous. Indeed, according to 
Commission’s officials, the agreement would not have been reached if social partners 
were not on board26. The need to enrol social partners is explicit for the Commission: 
“flexicurity was a break-through to speak about de-regulation of the labour markets 
while bringing the social partners on board”27. Social partners’ agreement was of 
particular political importance for the Commission because its services were 
conscious of the need for national ownership. Thus, the ‘pathways’ approach defined 
in the 2007 Communication directly targeted social partners. The aim was also to give 
them the power to engage in social dialogue and to make compromise28.  
From the social partners perspective, this issue was very difficult to deal with. It was 
not easy for their representatives in Brussels to oppose the concept as it was devoted 
to increase security for workers, but also because the Danish model was seen as an 
example of enhanced social dialogue, an essential element they could not reject. 
However, from their perspective, the Commission largely harnessed their agreement: 
“the sixty pages analysis of the Joint Agreement [with Business Europe] was reduced 
                                                
25 “Key Challenges facing European labour markets: a joint analysis of European Social 
Partners”, 18 October 2007. 
26 Interview, 31 May 2010 (a). 
27 Interview, 3 June 2010 (a). 
28 Interview, 31 May 2010 (a). 
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to one word, as if we had accepted the term ‘flexicurity’”29. Members in ETUC 
recognize that flexicurity is a difficult debate with national trade unions. The issue has 
become even more sensitive since the beginning of the financial and economic crisis 
and the considerable rise of European unemployment.  
The conclusion of this first section is that European institutions were, by no means, 
agents of national governments. As such, political process was largely insignificant to 
explain the construction of the European model of flexicurity. National political 
leaders did not promote the development of European integration in the employment 
policy field, a confirmation of most academic work on ‘Social Europe’ (Leibfried and 
Pierson, 1995). National bureaucrats in member states’ Permanent Representation to 
the EU were not involved in the uploading of their domestic policy models. Finally, 
the European Parliament was not a forum of politicisation of flexicurity. The issue 
was not completely depoliticised but the politicisation of flexicurity did not follow a 
classical left-right cleavage. All in all, politics were not central in the definition of the 
European model of flexicurity.  
The following section argues that the construction of the policy model has only be 
possible because specific actors, DG EMPL (and particularly its Directorate A in 
charge of Employment Strategy, policy development and coordination) and academic 
specialised in the field of labour market policies, formed a policy coalition and used 
specific instruments to build on a policy model that corresponds to their interests.  
 
SECTION 2. “LET’S BANDWAGON!” AND THE USE OF ACADEMIC EXPERTISE: MAKING 
POLICY DESIRABLE  
The first section of this paper highlights that, in the case of flexicurity and contrary to 
the main intergovernmentalism’s legacy, national governments were not gatekeepers 
of European integration. This second section shows that they did not have the 
monopoly of contacts between national actors and the EU political system. Rather, it 
contributes to the academic literature on the role of experts in the EU policy-making. 
Bennett and Howlett (1992) showed that knowledge is not simply “out there” readily 
available for policy-makers but has to be constructed - and used - by the relevant 
stakeholders. The case of flexicurity shows that the Commission explicitly called for 
                                                
29 Interview, 3 June 2010 (b). 
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expertise to precise and define European policy objectives.  
The literature on the role of experts in the EU policy-making tends to focus on 
organized policy knowledge in epistemic communities (Haas, 1992; Zito, 1998, 
2001), experts groups (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2008), high-level groups (Horn, 
2008), networks of expertise (Radaelli, 1998), think tanks (Stone, Denham and 
Garnett, 1998) or Committees (Pedler and Schaefer, 1996; Joerges and Vos, 1999). 
With Radaelli such studies show that "knowledge has less to do with specific actors 
than with the structure in which actors act” (1999: 769). Without undermining the 
importance of the ‘nature of power’, this paper shows that the types of actors not only 
matters but also that their influence does not only depend on the organizational 
structures in which they publicize their ideas. In the case of flexicurity, structured 
organizations and instances of academic expertise were not as crucial (or at least, they 
were so diverse that it is difficult to evaluate their role as such). Arguing that 
organizational structures were not as important for an analysis of the role of academic 
expertise may be surprising from a political science perspective. Indeed, as Radaelli 
put it, the main debate on the role of expertise in policy-making “is not about types of 
actor (experts instead of elected politicians) but about the change in the nature of 
power” (1999: 759). However, this section shows that their influence occurred 
through various sources of instances. Such variety blurs the structure of the 
organisation of academic expertise at the European level and makes such an influence 
precisely unstructured.  This was possible because flexicurity was discussed in the 
context of soft law and the OMC. Indeed, the development of periodic monitoring of 
national social reforms, implied by the OMC has led to an increasing pace of 
European reporting. This section shows that European reports dealt by DG EMPL 
were particularly important to craft ‘successful policy models’. Academic expertise 
was presented in these reports. As such, these reports were more crucial in the 
definition of flexicurity than structured instances of academic expertise.   
During the process of construction of the European flexicurity model, academics 
entered the game of European policy-making and were influential in the orientation of 
new policy objectives. It is clear that European bureaucrats in DG EMPL (and 
particularly within its Directorate A in charge of Employment Strategy, policy 
development and coordination) made their entrance in the process possible. This 
second section shows how this coalition of actors has been built around the 
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development (and constant increase) of the use of various forms of reports 
(‘scientific’ reports signed by academics or the OECD, Employment in Europe 
reports, assessment reports of European policies). In the aim of drawing the policy 
objectives of the EU, these reports have presented the situation, evolution and 
evaluation of national employment policies, which has led to their comparison. The 
focus on specific states (a strong interest in the Dutch performances in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, then replaced by the focus on Scandinavian performances, among 
which Denmark) has conduced to the staged competition of national employment 
policy measures. This competition finally conduced to what I call a “let’s bandwagon 
strategy”. What I mean is that, drawing on such evaluation and competition, the 
Commission called the countries laggards to bandwagon. Simultaneously, academic 
expertise on labour market policies were used to both legitimize the models that were 
made valuable by the Commission and to develop the principles of such policies 
schemes. While according to Radaelli, “the power of expertise is being 
counterbalanced by politicization” (1999), this paper shows that the use of expertise 
has accompanied the (relative) depoliticization of flexicurity studied in section 1.  
 
2.1. Comparisons and peer-reviews as support to policy-modeling 
The relauch of the Lisbon strategy and the decision to ask each member state to draw 
a NRP opened the box of policy evaluation to address national progresses linked with 
the Lisbon targets. However, since the implementation of the EES, the comparisons 
between employment protection legislations were conduced at the Council. In the late 
1990s, Dutch performance emerged during such comparisons. The Dutch 1999 
Flexicurity Act raised important interest for other member states. However, Dutch 
employment policy reforms were soon criticized because they involved important 
female part-time as well as because the disabled status was designed as such that 
employment rates were perceived to be higher. Such particularities were finally not 
considered as desirable and were hence “difficult to sold” to other member states30. 
The best practices of the “Dutch miracle” were replaced by the Danish employment 
policies “golden triangle”. It is constructed around the three elements of flexible 
labour markets, generous unemployment benefits and active labour market policies. 
                                                
30 Interview, 31 May 2010 (a). 
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The Danish model of flexicurity soon appeared as more complete and more 
competitive than the Dutch one. Maybe more importantly, the Danish model was also 
seen as a way to take social partners on board in a context of social criticism of the 
Dutch model’s shortcomings. The strong social dialogue and role of trade unions in 
Denmark as well as the high social protection of citizens was hardly criticisable from 
a trade union perspective, even more because it was presented as an alternative to the 
liberal model promoted by the OCDE in the 1990s. The Dutch model was hence over-
shadowed by the Danish model. However, Scandinavian countries cannot be 
considered as typical model providers in the sense that they did not politically invest 
in uploading strategies. The traditional distance maintained by Danish political 
leaders with regards to European integration did not change in that period. Although 
they welcomed numerous bilateral diplomatic missions in Copenhagen, they largely 
insisted on the non-transferability of their model, which they see as part of a complex 
system31. At the same time, the enlargement of the EU raised new issues: it was 
difficult to know which social protection systems would be more easily accepted by 
eastern European countries. In the early 2000s, the competition between the British 
liberal social protection system, the Danish social-democratic model and the Dutch 
mix of Scandinavian and continental-corporatist model was harsh. However, several 
OECD studies underlined the social costs of the British system and stressed the high 
number of workings-poor in the UK. Moreover, in 2004, Blair’s third way comes to 
political exhaustion. The focus was thus rebalanced towards the Scandinavian model. 
At that time, the easiness of redundancy in Denmark was also acceptable for the 
liberals.  
2.2. Reports to design: policy-modeling as legitimacy  
The objective of this subsection is not to present the broad history of European 
employment policy but rather to show that the 2003-2005 period was a crucial 
juncture that provides a basis to develop the flexibility-security axis. It shows that the 
relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy is a crucial step to explain the stabilization of 
flexicurity in 2007 and that, in this process, academics have been largely mobilized by 
the Commission. 
                                                
31 Interview, 4 June 2010 (a). 
 22 
The Lisbon Strategy was defined at the European Lisbon Council in 2000. Its aim was 
to make the EU "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion", by 2010. During the second part of the 2000s, the consensual 
objectives of the Lisbon Strategy found a tacit political consent but did not spark off 
enthusiasm of political leaders or citizens across Europe. These objectives were 
nevertheless soon criticized for their openness32. The various mid-term evaluations of 
the Strategy called for enhanced governance and the introduction of follow-up 
evaluation of national progresses by the Commission. The strengthening of European 
governance called for a more concrete definition of the objectives pursued. The 
instruments used in that field contributed to raise political attention toward the 
Scandinavian performances.  
Since the early 2000s, the Commission often mobilized experts whose aim was to 
discuss flexicurity, is principles and possible applications in different domestic 
settings.  
The European Council held in Brussels in March 2003 invited the Commission to 
establish a European Employment Taskforce, headed by Wim Kok, former Prime 
Minister of the Netherlands from 1994 to 2002. The objectives set by the Council 
were to examine key employment-related policy challenges and to identify practical 
reforms measures that can have the most direct and immediate impact on the ability of 
the member states to achieve the objectives and targets of the European Employment 
Strategy (EES). DG EMPL held the secretariat of the Employment Task Force. 
Antonis Kastrissianakis, Director of Directorate A (Employment and European 
Structural Fund Coordination) in DG EMPL, formally acted as Secretary, with the 
support of Hélène Clark, Head of Unit A2 (Employment strategy) and Luc Tholoniat, 
member of the Employment Strategy Unit. The Task Force was composed of seven 
other members, five of them were academics specialized in labour market policies33. 
                                                
32 See for example, Jean, Pisani-Ferry, (2005) « What’s wrong with Lisbon? », Paper 
prepared for the Munich Economic Summit in June 2005. Published on the web site 
www.bruegel.org, consulted on March, 20th, 2007, but also the Kok report, 2004, (see 
below). 
33 The five academic members were: Carlo Dell’Aringa (Professor at the Institute for 
Microeconomics and Labour at the University of Milano), Federico Duran Lopez (labour 
market specialist and Professor of Employment and Social Security at the University of 
Cordoba), Maria João Rodrigues (Professor at the Higher Institute for Business and Labour 
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The two other members were representatives of social partners34. As noted earlier, 
Wim Kok was the main politician involved in the definition of flexicurity at the 
European level. As former Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1994-2002), he was the 
leader of the ‘purple coalition’35 and hence considered by the Commission as a 
needed and relevant go-between between the left and right36. The first report by Wim 
Kok, entitled “Jobs Jobs Jobs, Creating more employment in Europe”, was published 
in November 2003. The ambition of Wim Kok was also to stress the Dutch recent 
employment reforms: “Jobs, jobs, jobs” was also the slogan of one of its 1993 
political campaign in the Netherlands37.  
In 2004, he is asked another report on the assessment of the Lisbon Strategy. 
Importantly, the task force did not represent academics as much as the previous one. 
This time, in the context of the relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy, the aim was not so 
much to discuss employment policy objectives, but rather to increase the national 
ownership of the Lisbon Strategy. As the part devoted to employment policy analysis 
was presented in the previous report (2003), the “employment narrative was already 
there” and in fact used to reinvigorate the Lisbon Strategy38. Hence, the 2004 task 
force was rather composed by social and economic partners representatives. Only two 
members were academics39. The report announced: “the challenge for the labour 
market is to find the right balance between flexibility and security”40. It invited the 
member states to take political initiatives to improve internal and external flexibility 
of labour markets, suppress the obstacles to part-time work and promote new forms of 
security in the employment and revenues field. Lisbon II consolidated the policy ideas 
                                                
Studies of the Lisbon University Institute and also President of the Social Sciences Advisory 
Group to the European Commission), Christopher Pissarides (Professor of Economics and 
Director of the research programme on Technology and Growth at the Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics and Günther Schmid (Director of Employment, 
Social Structure, and Welfare State at the Social Science Research Center in Berlin and 
Professor of Political Economy at the Free University of Berlin). 
34 Anna Ekström was President of the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations 
(SACO) and Annette Roux was CEO of the Bénéteau company. 
35 Cabinets Kok I and Kok II comprised Kok’s Labour Party, the People’s Party for Freedom 
and Democracy, and the Democrats 66.  
36 Interview, 3 June 2010 (c). 
37 I owe this information to an interviewee. 
38 Interview, 31 May 2010 (a). 
39 Luigi Paganetto (Professor of international economics at Rome-Tor Vergata University) 
and Dariusz Rosati (Professor of economics) who was also Member of the European 
Parliament since June 2004. 
40 Report from the High-Level Group chaired by Wim Kok, Facing the Challenge, The 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment, November 2004, p. 33. 
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of the EES and also used knowledge available at DG EMPL, developed through the 
“Employment in Europe Reports” since the 1990s. Hence, instead of reinforcing the 
intergovernmental governance of the social field at the European level, Kok’s reports 
consolidated the vested priorities of the EES. The rapid relaunch of the Lisbon 
Strategy and the agreement toward reinforced governance would not have been 
possible without the experience of the previous decade. According to some experts 
within the Commission, the EES was institutionally expulsed to leave some room to 
the Lisbon Strategy41. According to one interlocutor, “at that time, we were losing the 
momentum”42. Because of the strong critics of the mid-term Lisbon’s failures, the 
new Commission decided to concentrate on the main issue for citizens and their 
political leaders: it hence made economic growth as its core business and coupled it to 
the fight against unemployment. The refocus of Lisbon II on growth and jobs 
illustrated this concern. To some interviewees in the Commission, Lisbon II marked 
the real start of the Lisbon Strategy. It then tried to involve member states’ political 
leaders to promote an integrated strategy with reinforced bilateral relations between 
the Commission and national governments. Following the need of narrowing the gap 
between both processes (economic and employment), the BEPGs and the 
Employment Guidelines were both merged into the same document. In 2005, the 
relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy (Lisbon II) focused on the involvement of member 
states’ political leaders and promoted an integrated strategy. For some, Lisbon II 
marked the real start of the Lisbon Strategy. Actually, in practice, experience showed 
that the new Integrated Guidelines contributed to the expulsion of the EES, so that it 
could leave room to the Lisbon Strategy43.  
In the summer 2006, DG EMPL created the Expert Group on Flexicurity. Four out of 
five of its members are academics specialised in labour market policies, among which 
Tom Whiltagen was rapporteur. Tom Whiltagen is a Dutch academic who was highly 
influential in the emergence of flexicurity at the European level. Two other experts 
who were affiliated to the social partners, were advisors in the group. The main task 
of the group set the Commission was to review relevant academic literature and 
identify the national practices in that field. The aim was clearly to advise the 
Commission on the necessary conditions of flexicurity policy measures in order to 
                                                
41 Idem. 
42 Interview, 3 June 2010 (c). 
43 Interview, 31 May 2010 (a); 3 June 2010 (c). 
 25 
help for the definition of flexicurity pathways, that will be integrate in the 
Communication of 2007 (and finally, as a result of member states’ rejected of the 
approach, only in the annex of the Communication). During the meetings of the 
Expert Group on Flexicurity, an Inter-Service Steering Group led by DG EMPL was 
sometimes present in order to smooth the process with Commission’s other 
directorates general44.  
The Commission used such academic knowledge in various reports carried by DG 
EMPL. This paper hence confirms Cram’s assertion on the policy entrepreneurship 
capacity of the Commission, an institution whose main resource is the possession of 
knowledge (1993). This section sheds light on the sources of the Commission’s 
knowledge and the way it DG EMPL organized it in the case of flexicurity. 
Günther Schmid, member of the 2003 Task Force held by Wim Kok is a German 
politist and economist, director of the “Labour market policy and employment” unit 
research of the Social Science Research Centre in Berlin (Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin für Sozialforschung, WZB). He introduced the concept of transitional labour 
markets in the early 1990s. He then collabourated with Bernard Gazier, a French 
economist, member of the Institut Universitaire de France and they both actively 
engaged in the uploading of this policy model in their respective countries but also 
within international organizations: the OECD, the European Commission and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). In this latter organization they soon 
collabourated with Peter Auer, currently chief of the employment analysis and 
research unit of the Economic and Labour Market Analysis Department of the 
Employment Sector, at the ILO. Peter Auer was formerly a research fellow at the 
WZB and head of the European employment observatory. Schmid, Gazier and Auer 
developed the concept of transitional labour market stressing that full-employment is 
possible but that transitions (from education to the first job, from one job to another, 
from work to family life or from work to retirement) are not sufficient and equally 
secure. They stated that in order for people to take new risks and thus increase 
employment rates, such transitions should be secure collectively and entail a mix of 
socialized and market insured risks (Schmid and Gazier, 2002; Auer and Gazier, 
2002). However, despite of the strong influence of their work, their notion was not 
picked up as such by European institutions in their stabilized policy documents.   
                                                
44 Interview, 17 June 2010. 
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The work conduced by Tom Wilthagen a Dutch sociologist highly involved in 
European and networks activities in the field of labour market policies, was crucially 
influential. As rapporteur of the European Expert Group on Flexicurity set up in 2007 
he worked on the definition of the flexicurity pathways introduced in the annex of 
COM2007(359). He was also a member of other EU working groups established by 
the Council of Europe45 and contributed to the work of the European Parliament on 
the modernization of labour law. Furthermore, he is the current director of the 
multidisciplinary and inter-faculty research Institute for Research Institute for 
Flexicurity, Labour Market Dynamics and Social Cohesion (ReflecT) with was set in 
January 2009 at Tilburg University. Importantly, Tilburg University now holds an 
important network of academics on flexicurity, which has become the main academic 
forum for research on employment, labour markets and flexicurity.  
Tom Wilthagen started to work on the flexicurity neologism in the late 1990s 
(Wilthagen, 1998). The Commission largely picked up his definition, which was 
quoted in the 2006 Employment in Europe report46. It seems that Wilthagen’s 
capacity to express understandable views to a large audience was also used by the 
Commission, so that he was able to find a public echo among political decision-
makers in Europe.  
Tom Wilthagen was, of course, not the only academic to develop such a notion. Per 
Madsen, a Danish also developed academic work on flexicurity with his colleagues 
(Bredgaard, Larsen, Madsen, 2005; 2006). They focused on the ‘Danish Golden 
Triangle’ (loose legislation on employment protection, generous social safety net for 
the unemployed, active labour market policies) that was also used in the 2006 
Employment in Europe report. Madsen et al. also focused on the transferability of the 
Danish model (Bredgaard, Larsen, Madsen, 2006; Jørgensen and Madsen, 2007).  
The neologism “flexicurity” was considered as a more meaningful term for political 
leaders, social partners and European citizens, than were others terms like the 
                                                
45 EU working group on self-employment and micro businesses and of the Working Group on 
the Reconciliation of Labour Market Flexibilization and Social Cohesion. 
46 Employment in Europe, 2006: 77:"a degree of job, employment, income and combination 
security that facilitates the labour market careers and biographies of workers with a relatively 
weak position and allows for enduring and high quality labour market participation and social 
inclusion, while at the same time providing a degree of numerical (both external and internal), 
functional and wage flexibility that allows for labour markets’ (and individual companies’) 
timely and adequate adjustment to changing conditions in order to maintain and enhance 
competitiveness and productivity”. 
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“transitional labour markets” (Schmid and Gazier, 2002; Auer and Gazier, 2002) or 
“decent work” as the ILO developed it in the late 1990s.  
After the relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy and the real start of peer-reviews processes 
at the Council, the evaluation process of the NRP was disputed between the 
Commission and the Council. Both institutions decided to enrol in the process. 
Member states have often criticized the evaluation made by the Commission because 
of its lack of scientific expertise. The Council hence decided to set a LIME (Lisbon 
Methodology) group in order to conduce its own evaluation of national measures. The 
LIME group conducts regular Cambridge Reviews especially devoted to employment 
policies. It also asked the Commission to set a “Mission for Flexicurity”. The aim of 
the Mission was to identify the differences between national flexicurity measures. 
“The aim of the Mission was to show that different models coexist”47, which was an 
important issue for EMCO. A clear division appeared between the Nordic countries 
(which were not interested because they already have implemented flexicurity 
measures) and the southern countries, which were interested in the concept but have 
difficulties to implement it. Although the Danish model of flexicurity was recognized 
as valuable by EMCO, the role of the member states in the construction of the 
European flexicurity model remains ambiguous. If the flexibility-security axis was 
rather consensual, each member states have had different interests. Spain was 
favourable to the concept because the country experienced a lot of atypical work and 
“did not want to be the bad guy”48. Germany was quite favourable to the concept as 
the government was preparing the Hartz reforms. National leaders considered that 
using European expertise and successful foreign policy models could be helpful. 
 
CONCLUSION  
In 2006-2007, it was clear for EMCO that a “one-size-fits-all” policy model would 
not be acceptable. Even if DG EMPL of the Commission – and academics working 
for the Commission – had a particular national model in mind, the non-transferability 
of the Danish model was particularly stressed by the member states. The Commission 
hence tried to define common principles of flexicurity and to promote interactions and 
synergies between different dimensions. The choice was then to define “policy 
                                                
47 Interview, 31 May 2010, (c). 
48 Interview, 3 June 2010 (c). 
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pathways” to strengthen the idea according to which European flexicurity was not 
about the transposition of the Danish model in all member states. Even if it was clear 
that the Danish model was not completely transferable, it had nevertheless served as a 
way of making it acceptable for the member states (and social partners). In the 
contrary, it seems to be clear for Commission’s civil servants that if flexicurity were 
associated to the UK, the Commission would have failed to make it acceptable49. The 
Danish model was however very useful for the Commission because social partners 
could hardly defend the idea according which Denmark does not provide a tolerable 
level of social protection. Moreover, the role of social partners and collective 
bargaining have always constituted a crucial element of the model and was seen as 
particularly desirable for trade unions, although they were aware of the short-comings 
of policy transfers.  
In both EMCO and the Commission, the technical dimension to define a hierarchy 
between priorities, but also to evaluate the progress induced by national policy 
measures, caused internal debates. Beyond such difficulties, the aim pursued by 
EMCO was also to provide non-Scandinavian examples of flexicurity in order to 
counterbalance the Dutch, and then the Danish model, underlined by the Commission.  
However, despite the disagreements and conflicts between EMCO and DG EMPL 
(and one can say, member states opposition to the increasing role of EU regulation in 
the employment field), this paper showed that the construction of the European 
flexicurity policy-model was not the result of a political process. Politics (domestic 
uploading strategies, political leaders and political parties, etc.) cannot explain the 
emergence of the European flexicurity model. Rather, the alliance between academic 
experts and a few actors in the directorate general of employment affairs of the 
Commission took the lead over political mobilization. The use of national policy 
comparisons in European reports and policy documents allowed DG EMPL to use a 
“let’s bandwagon strategy” to expand its legitimacy within the Commission and 
among national actors. 
                                                
49 Interview, 3 June 2010 (a). 
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